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Abstract
Ad exchanges are kind of the most popular online advertising marketplaces for trading ad spaces over the Internet.
Ad exchanges run auctions to sell diverse ad spaces on the publishers’ web-pages to advertisers, who want to display
ads on ad spaces. However, the parties in an ad auction cannot verify whether the auction is carried out correctly
or not. Furthermore, the advertisers are usually unwilling to reveal their sensitive bids and identities. In this paper,
we jointly consider the auction verifiability and the advertisers’ privacy preservation, and thus propose ERA, which
is an Efficient, pRivacy-preserving, and verifiAble online auction mechanism for ad exchanges. ERA exploits an order
preserving encryption scheme to guarantee privacy preservation, and achieves verifiability by constructing a novel protocol
of privacy preserving integer comparison, which is built on the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme. We extensively
evaluate the performance of ERA, and our evaluation results show that ERA satisfies several desirable properties with
low computation, communication, and storage overheads, so ERA can be easily deployed in today’s ad exchanges.
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1. Introduction
Ad exchange is considered as a new type of digital mar-
ketplace, where ad places on the web-pages can be traded
in real-time via an auction mechanism [3, 4]. A number of
ad exchanges have emerged on the Internet, such as Dou-
bleClick [5], Adecn [6], RightMedia [7], and OpenX [8].
Ad exchanges serve as a highly effective and efficient tool
for selling and buying advertisements, and benefit both
publishers and advertisers [9, 10, 11]. There are billions of
ad transactions per day across more than 2 million web-
sites [12], and Internet companies, such as Google, Mi-
crosoft, and Yahoo, have extracted a large amount of rev-
enue every year from the ad transactions in their ad ex-
change platforms [3].
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In ad exchanges, second-price auction, promoting the
ideal of competitive pricing and economic efficiency [13],
is regarded as the most important technique to allocate
ad spaces [14, 15]. An ad auction allows each interested
advertiser to bid for a certain ad space, and the highest
bidding advertiser gets the opportunity to display her/his
advertisement. However, the current ad auctions have two
critical security problems, i.e., privacy leakage and auction
manipulation. On one hand, each advertiser needs to sub-
mit her/his sensitive identity and bid to participate in the
ad auction, which will inevitably breach her/his privacies.
Moreover, such type of privacy leakage brings in bidding
unfairness, since the advertiser, who knows other adver-
tisers’ bidding strategies, possibly gains a huge advantage
in the present or subsequent auctions [16]. On the other
hand, publishers and advertisers have no control over the
outcome determination, and are forced to unconditionally
accept it, even if the ad exchange may manipulate or cor-
rupt the auction [17]. Under such paradigm, the correct-
ness of ad auctions is totally relied on the reputations of ad
exchanges. Therefore, it is highly essential to design a pri-
vacy preserving and verifiable auction mechanism, where
ad exchanges are able to calculate the auction outcome,
and prove its correctness without leaking the private in-
formation of advertisers. If privacy preservation and ver-
ifiability can be guaranteed simultaneously, ad exchanges
will certainly attract a larger scale of advertisers and pub-
lishers to engage in.
Unfortunately, existing auction mechanisms rarely con-
sidered these two properties at the same time. For ex-
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ample, the auction mechanisms in [16, 18, 19] achieved
verifiability under the assumption that the bidding infor-
mation should be revealed to the auctioneer. In contrast,
some researchers have proposed potential solutions for bid
protection [20, 21, 22], but they ignored the consideration
of verifiability. Furthermore, the auction in the online ad
exchange significantly differs from these conventional auc-
tion mechanisms due to the following two features:
• Low Latency: Unlike traditional goods, ad spaces
are extremely perishable. If an auction for a single ad
space does not complete before the web-page is loaded
into the user’s browser, then the opportunity to place
an ad is lost. In particular, the time for executing an
ad auction is usually limited in a short interval, e.g.,
typically 100 milliseconds [23].
• Large Scale: There are billions of ad auctions per
day with millions of advertisers participating in [4].
Considering above two requirements, there are three ma-
jor challenges to integrate privacy preservation and veri-
fiability in ad exchanges. The first and the thorniest de-
sign challenge comes from the efficiency requirement of
ad auctions, i.e., ad auctions should support a large scale
of advertisers with low latency. Specifically, the online
phase of winner determination and payment calculation
should be evaluated within 100ms, which in turn hinders
the application of heavy-weight cryptosystems even if they
provide strong security assurance. Yet, another challenge
is that auction execution and privacy preservation seem
to be contradictory objectives. Evaluating the outcome
of an ad auction allows the auctioneer to examine all the
bids to determine the winner and corresponding payment,
whereas preserving the privacy tends to prevent her/him
from learning these confidential contents. The last but not
least design challenge is how to guarantee verifiability. Al-
though the auction verification can be performed offline,
and has no strict time constraint, it is never an easy job to
design a verifiable protocol without breaking the property
of privacy preservation.
In this paper, we jointly consider the three design chal-
lenges, and thus propose ERA, which is an Efficient,
pRivacy-preserving, and verifiAble online auction mecha-
nism for ad exchanges. ERA first formalizes the allocation
of ad spaces into a three-tier auction model, including one
auctioneer, ad networks, and advertisers, where interme-
diary ad networks can help the auctioneer calculate the
auction outcome in a parallel way. ERA then employs
an order preserving encryption scheme to generate a set
of mapped bids, which hide the exact values of original
bids while maintaining their ranking order. Therefore, the
auction can be executed in the ciphertext space to guar-
antee bid protection. Besides, for identity preservation,
each ad network needs to mask her/his bidder members’
unique identities. At last, to facilitate verification, ERA
constructs a privacy preserving integer comparison pro-
tocol by capitalizing the homomorphic properties of the
Table 1: Notations
Notation Remark
Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θz} The original bid space consisting of z possible bids
Θ̂ = {θˆ1, θˆ2, . . . , θˆz} The mapped bid space generated via the order preserving en-
cryption scheme
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sl} The unique identities of l ad bidders
B = {b1, b2, . . . , bl} The original bids of l ad bidders
Bˆ = {bˆ1, bˆ2, . . . , bˆl} The mapped bids of l ad bidders
A = {a1, a2, . . . , aw} The set of w ad networks
smax, bsec The winner and corresponding payment
Gρ The multiplicative cyclic group of prime order ρ
g, h Two generators of Gρ
n, φ Public and private keys of the Paillier cryptosystem
En(·), D(·) Paillier encryption and decryption algorithms
Paillier cryptosystem.
We summarize our key contributions as follows:
• We first model the problem of ad space allocation
in ad exchanges as a second-price auction model, in
which there are one auctioneer, a set of intermediary
ad networks, and their subscribed ad bidders.
• To the best of our knowledge, ERA is the first online
auction mechanism achieving both privacy preserva-
tion and verifiability. Besides, specific to the ad ex-
change, we incorporate the considerations of its three-
tire structure and stringent efficiency requirement.
• We have implemented ERA, and extensively evalu-
ate its performance. Our evaluation results show that
ERA achieves good effectiveness and efficiency in the
large-scale ad exchanges. In particular, when the auc-
tion latency is limited within 10ms, ERA with 100 ad
networks can support more than 5 million advertisers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we introduce the ad exchange model, and
present the security requirements. We describe some rele-
vant cryptographic techniques in Section 3, and propose a
protocol of privacy preserving integer comparison in Sec-
tion 4. The detailed design of ERA is presented in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 6, we evaluate ERA, and show the eval-
uation results. In Section 7, we briefly review the related
work. Finally, we draw conclusions and give our future
work in Section 8.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we first describe system and auction
models for ad exchanges. We then present two desirable
security requirements on the design. The frequently used
notations are listed in Table 1.
2.1. System Model
We consider a real-time online advertising marketplace,
where there are web users, publishers, one ad exchange, ad
networks, and advertisers. Generally, every view of web
users on a publisher’s web-page stimulates the conduction
of a second-price ad auction, in which the ad spaces on the
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Figure 1: An ad exchange ecosystem.
web-page are efficiently allocated among advertisers. We
now present the system model of an ad exchange, which
is based on the model proposed by Muthukrishnan [3],
and is a generation of current ad exchange models in the
literature [5].
As shown in Figure 1, an ad auction is initiated when a
web-user visits to a publisher’s web-page, which contains
a HTML iframe of JavaScript snippet that generates an
ad request to the ad exchange (Step 1 ). From the ad
request, the ad exchange can extract the relevant infor-
mation, e.g., the behaviour features of the web-user, the
reserve price set by the publisher, the type of the ad space,
and the time stamp (Step 2 ). The relevant information
is delivered to all advertisers through ad networks (Step
3 ). Based on the provided information, advertisers can
accurately derive the valuation over the ad space. The ad-
vertisers submit their bids, which are calculated according
to their valuations, to the ad networks that they belong to,
and then to the ad exchange (Step 4 ). According to the
reported bids, the ad exchange runs a second-price auc-
tion to determine the winner and her/his payment, which
are published to the public (Step 5 ). The ad exchange
requires the winner to submit her/his ad tag and charge,
both of which are further sent to the publisher (Step 6 ,
7 , and 8 ). In the end, the publisher displays the win-
ner’s advertisement on her/his web-page (Step 9 ). The
whole process typically completes within 100ms.
2.2. Auction Model
In this subsection, we model the ad space allocation as
a sealed bid auction with a single item. The trading items
in ad auctions are ad spaces, which can be classified into
several types based on the information of web-pages, e.g.,
videos, images, and texts. Without loss of generality, we
consider a specific type of ad space in the following dis-
cussion. In our ad auction model, there are four major
entities: ad bidders, ad networks, an agent, and an auc-
tioneer, which are introduced in details as follows.
Ad bidders: The unique identities of l ad bidders are
denoted by S = {s1, s2, . . . , sl}. Each bidder si ∈ S has an
original bid bi for the trading ad space, and an ad tag indi-
cating the identity of her/his advertisement. The original
bids of all bidders are denoted by B = {b1, b2, . . . , bl}.
Agent: We introduce a new party, called agent, to pro-
vide bidders with mapped bids, which are used to design
a privacy preserving auction. The agent employs an or-
der preserving encryption scheme to construct the set of
mapped bids, denoted by Bˆ =
{
bˆ1, bˆ2, . . . , bˆl
}
. We as-
sume that the agent is honest-but-curious1 in our adver-
sary model.
Ad networks: The set of w ad networks is denoted by
A = {a1, a2, . . . , aw}. Each ad network aj ∈ A manages
a few subscribed ad bidders, who pre-store their mapped
bids and ad tags on the ad network aj . In this way, the
bidders do not need to encrypt and submit their bids on
the fly, and thus the interaction between bidders and ad
networks can be significantly reduced.
Auctioneer: The auctioneer, acting as the ad exchange,
calculates the auction outcome: the winner and her/his
corresponding payment.
The ad auction is divided into two stages: the internal
auction stage for the ad bidders in each ad network, and
the global auction stage for all ad bidders. We employ the
classical second-price auction to determine the outcome of
each auction stage. Specifically, in the internal auction
stage, each ad network aj ∈ A selects the highest and
second highest mapped bids from her/his subscribed ad
bidders, and then sends to the auctioneer. In the global
auction stage, after collecting all the pairs of the highest
and second highest mapped bids from ad networks, the
auctioneer then chooses the globally highest and second
highest mapped bids, denoted as bˆmax and bˆsec. We also
let smax denote the identity of the bidder with the globally
highest bid. Besides, the original bids of bˆmax and bˆsec are
bmax and bsec, respectively. The outcome of an ad auction
can be expressed as: the winner smax and her/his payment
bsec.
In practical ad auctions, on one hand, each bidder wishes
to keep her/his bid and identity secret so that other bid-
ders do not gain an advantage over her/him in the present
or subsequent auctions. On the other hand, ad bidders and
any system participant want to be able to verify whether
the result of an auction is correct, even in the face of a
corrupt auctioneer. Thus, we are interested in designing
secure ad auctions with the following properties simulta-
neously.
Definition 1 (Privacy Preserving Ad Auction [22, 25]).
An ad auction is privacy preserving if it satisfies:
(1) Bid protection: the original bid of each ad bidder
should be hidden from all the ad networks, the auc-
tioneer, the agent, and the other ad bidders;
(2) Identity preservation: each ad bidder’s unique identity
can only be revealed to her/his ad network.
1The agent is honest-but-curious if she follows the designed pro-
tocol but tries to gather information about other participants [24].
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Algorithm 1 1-out-of-z Oblivious Transfer (OT 1z )
Initialization:
System parameters: (g, h,Gρ);
Sender’s input: M = (m1,m2, . . . ,mz);
Receiver’s choice: α;
1: Receiver sends: y = grhα, r ∈R Zρ;
2: Sender replies ξi = (g
ki ,mi(y/h
i)ki), ki ∈R Zρ, 1 ≤
i ≤ z;
3: By ξα = (a, b), receiver computes mα = b/a
r.
Definition 2 (Verifiable Ad Auction [16, 19]). An ad auc-
tion is verifiable if the correctness of outcome can be veri-
fied by ad bidders and any third party.
3. Cryptographic Tools
In this section, we briefly review some relevant crypto-
graphic techniques. We first present a secure and efficient
information platform, called certificated bulletin board.
We then introduce order preserving encryption, oblivious
transfer, and Paillier homomorphic encryption, which are
building blocks of our following design.
3.1. Certificated Bulletin Board
Certificated bulletin board is an electronic version of
traditional bulletin board [26, 27], which can be a pub-
lic and trustworthy website maintained and updated by a
certain authority, e.g., the auctioneer in our model. A cer-
tificated bulletin board can be read by anybody, but can
be written only by some authorized parties, such as the
auctioneer and the ad networks. For non-reputation, all
posts on the certificated bulletin board should be digitally
signed ahead of publication. We introduce such a pub-
lic broadcast channel to solve the problem of information
asymmetry among different system participants, and thus
to facilitate the auction verification.
3.2. Order Preserving Encryption Scheme
Order preserving encryption scheme, introduced by
Agrawal et al. [28], is a representative technique that
preserves the ordering of plaintexts in the ciphertext
space. In particular, given a set of numeric data M =
{m1,m2, . . . ,mz} with m1 ≥ m2 ≥ . . . ≥ mz, the function
OPES(·) maps each original data mi to the mapped data
mˆi = OPES(mi), such that mˆ1 ≥ mˆ2 ≥ . . . ≥ mˆz.
Order preserving encryption enables the comparison op-
eration to be directly applied on the encrypted data with-
out decrypting them. By exploiting this property, the
outcome of the ad auction can be evaluated among the
mapped bids, and thus the bid protection can be achieved.
Algorithm 2 Paillier Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
System parameters: (p, q, r)
Public key: n = pq
Private key: φ = (p− 1)(q − 1)
Encryption: C = En(m, r) = (1 +mn) · rn(mod n2);
C−1 = E−1n (m, r) = (1 − mn) ·
rn(mod n2).
Decryption: m = D(C, φ) = (C
φ−1)/φ mod n2
n ;
m = D(C, r) = (C·r
−n mod n2)−1
n .
Random Value Recovery: r = Cn
−1(mod φ)(mod n).
3.3. Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer [29] describes a two-party paradigm
of secret exchange between a sender and a receiver. In par-
ticular, the sender has z messages M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mz},
and the receiver wants to know one of the messages, e.g.,
mα. The oblivious transfer scheme guarantees that the
receiver just obtains the message mα without knowing the
other z − 1 messages, while the sender has no idea of the
receiver’s choice α. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of
1-out-of-z oblivious transfer OT 1z , where the multiplicative
cyclic group Gρ is of the prime order ρ, and g, h are its two
generators.
The oblivious transfer scheme allows each bidder to ob-
tain a mapped bid from the agent, while not disclosing
her/his original bid.
3.4. Paillier Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
To facilitate the practical computation on encrypted
data, Paillier [30] introduces a somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme, which preserves the group homomor-
phism of addition and allows multiplication by a constant.
As shown in Algorithm 2, p and q are two large primes.
The parameter r is a random value chosen from Z∗n, i.e.,
gcd(r, n) = 1. Besides, we recall that the private key φ is
actually the Euler’s totient function of n, the number of
integers relatively prime to n. Moreover, the ciphertext of
a message m encrypted under the public key n using the
random value r is denoted as C = En(m, r). Sometimes,
r is omitted to simplify the notation as C = En(m).
The Paillier scheme has three desirable properties as fol-
lows:
• Information Theoretic Hiding : Due to intractabil-
ity of Decisional Composite Residuosity Assump-
tion (DCRA) [30], it is hard for any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary to recover the plaintexts
from the ciphertexts without knowing the private key
or the random value.
• Computationally Binding : Given two dif-
ferent pairs of plaintext and random value
{(m1, r1), (m2, r2)|m1 6= m2, r1 6= r2}, it is in-
feasible to encrypt m1 and m2 such that
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En(m1, r1) = En(m2, r2). Therefore, the consis-
tency of any posted ciphertext can be verified by
re-encrypting with the claimed random value.
• Additive Homomorphism: The multiplication of two
ciphertexts is equal to the encryption of two corre-
sponding plaintexts’ addition, i.e.,
C1×C2 = En(m1, r1)×En(m2, r2) = En(m1+m2, r1·r2).
In ERA, we guarantee the bid privacy and consistency
by capitalizing the first two properties, whereas the homo-
morphic property is utilized to support auction verifica-
tion.
4. Privacy Preserving Integer Comparison
In this section, we propose a privacy preserving inte-
ger comparison protocol, which is the basis of verification
process.
In the privacy preserving integer comparison protocol,
there are two major entities: a prover P and a verifier V.
The prover P knows two non-negative integers x1 and x2
as well as their comparison relation, e.g., x1 ≥ x2. The
main goal of the prover P is to convince the verifier V that
the declared comparison relation is true without disclosing
x1 and x2
2. Here, we note that if x1 < x2 holds in fact, it
is computationally infeasible for the prover P to generate
a witness to x1 ≥ x2.
For two non-negative integers x1, x2 < n/2, the inequal-
ity x1 ≥ x2 holds if and only if (x1 − x2) mod n < n/2.
Thus, to demonstrate that x1 ≥ x2, the prover P can
equivalently show the following three inequalities hold:
x1 < n/2, x2 < n/2, (x1 − x2) mod n < n/2. (1)
Here, we observe that the original integer comparison
problem can be further reduced to a classical problem of
range proof, i.e., proving in zero knowledge x < n/2. In
particular, our range proof protocol is based on the bit
representations of encrypted value. In addition, we prove
x < n/2 by showing x < 2t < n/2, where 2t is a preset
upper bound of x.
Before proposing the range proof protocol, we first in-
troduce a test set TS, which is a set of t Paillier-type
ciphertexts:
TS = {Ci|i ∈ [1, t]} = {En(mi, ri)|i ∈ [1, t]}
=
{
En(2
i−1, ri)|i ∈ [1, t]
}
. (2)
We note that all elements in TS should be ordered ran-
domly to conceal the linkability between Ci and mi.
2Our privacy preserving integer comparison differs from the clas-
sical Yao’s millionaires’ problem [31], in which the prover P knows
x1 and the verifier V knows x2.
Given C = En(x, rx), the prover P can obliviously prove
to the verifier V that x < 2t < n/2 by conducting the
following two steps:
Step 1: Proof Generation
x can be uniquely represented by a sum of distinct pow-
ers of 2:
x = 2t1 + 2t2 + . . .+ 2tk . (3)
The prover P selects the ciphertext set Cx =
{Ct1 , Ct2 , . . . , Ctk} of the plaintexts 2t1 , 2t2 , . . . , 2tk from
the test set TS, and derives a new random value r∗ from
the corresponding random values rt1 , rt2 , . . . , rtk and rx,
where
r∗ = (r−1x × rt1 × rt2 · · · × rtk) (mod n). (4)
The set of ciphertexts Cx and the random value r∗ are
packaged as the proof, which is sent to the verifier V.
Step 2: Verification
The verifier V verifies the correctness of the relation x <
2t < n/2 by checking whether
E−1n (x, rx) ·Ct1 ·Ct2 · . . . ·Ctk (mod n2) = En(0, r∗). (5)
The above equation holds if and only if x = 2t1 + 2t2 +
. . .+2tk . Together with the fact that the cardinality of Cx
is less than or equal to t, the verify V can conclude that
x = 2t1 +2t2 + . . .+2tk <= 20+21+ . . .+2t−1 < 2t < n/2.
(6)
Now, the prover P can convince the verifier V that x1 ≥
x2 by applying the range proof protocol on the following
three inequations:
x1 < 2
t < n/2,
x2 < 2
t < n/2,
(x1 − x2) mod n < 2t < n/2.
The correctness of the verification phase, especially
Equation (5), can be proved below:
Proof. We first shift the term E−1n (x, rx) in Equation (5)
from the left hand side (LHS) to the right hand side (RHS),
and get an equivalent form:
Ct1 ·Ct2 ·. . .·Ctk (mod n2) = En(x, rx)·En(0, r∗) (mod n2).
(7)
Next, by applying the additive homomorphism of the Pail-
lier encryption scheme, we expand the left and right hand
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sides of Equation (7), respectively:
LHS = Ct1 · Ct2 · . . . · Ctk(mod n2)
= En(2
t1 , rt1) · En(2t2 , rt2) · . . . En(2tk , rtk)(mod n2)
= En(2
t1 + 2t2 + · · ·+ 2tk , rt1 × rt2 . . .× rtk)(mod n2),
RHS = En(x, rx) · En(0, r∗) (mod n2)
= En(x+ 0, rx × r∗) (mod n2)
= En(x, rx × r−1x × rt1 × rt2 . . .× rtk) (mod n2)
= En(x, rt1 × rt2 . . .× rtk) (mod n2).
Due to the uniqueness of Paillier-type ciphertext, we have
LHS = RHS ⇔ x = 2t1 + 2t2 + . . .+ 2tk .
This completes our proof. 
5. Design of ERA
In this section, we propose ERA, which is an efficient,
privacy-preserving, and verifiable online ad auction mech-
anism.
5.1. Design Overview
By exploiting the cryptographic tools in Section 3 and
the privacy preserving integer comparison protocol in Sec-
tion 4, ERA achieves privacy preservation and verifiability
simultaneously. In what follows, we illustrate the design
challenges and the design rationales.
The first design challenge is privacy preservation in
terms of both original bids and ad bidders’ identities. We
first consider bid protection. We introduce an agent to
encrypt the original bids as mapped bids using the order
preserving encryption scheme. Therefore, the ad networks
and the auctioneer can learn the ranking order of bids by
comparing the corresponding mapped bids to calculate the
auction outcome. However, the semi-honest agent may re-
veal the original bids if she can obtain the mapped bids,
and we tackle this vulnerability by taking two cooperative
steps. First, each bidder fetches her/his mapped bid from
the agent via oblivious transfer, which guarantees that the
mapped bid selection does not leak her/his choice. Even
so, the agent may still access the mapped bids on the cer-
tificated bulletin board. Thus, the auctioneer needs to
provide one more encryption on the mapped bids before
publication. In this way, as long as there exists no col-
lusion between the agent and the auctioneer, the original
bids can be well protected.
We then consider identity preservation, i.e., the bidding
order in an internal auction can only be known by the
managing ad network. Since we employ order preserving
encryption to do the first-layer encryption, the order of
mapped bids is exactly the same as that of original bids. If
the identities of advertisers are not protected, the auction-
eer may uniquely link a bidder with her/his bidding rank.
To prevent this undesirable information leakage, each ad
network needs to encrypt the identities of her/his bidder
members
The second design challenge comes from auction veri-
fication. The ad networks and the auctioneer in ad ex-
changes exclusively possess the bidding information, while
any other system participant, as a verifier, cannot access
it. This information asymmetry causes significant difficul-
ties to our verifiable auction design. To solve this problem,
we first introduce a certificated bulletin board to publish
all the encrypted bidding information, including doubly
encrypted bids and masked identities. We then employ
the proposed privacy preserving integer comparison pro-
tocol to enable any verifier to check the order of mapped
bids, i.e., the order of original bids, and thus verify the
correctness of auction execution.
5.2. Design Details
We now introduce ERA in details. ERA consists of three
stages: initialization, auction execution, and verification
operation.
5.2.1. Initialization
The initialization stage contains two parts: bid and
identity encryptions, and information publication.
Bid and Identity Encryptions: The original bid
space Θ is defined as the set of z possible bids:
Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θz} ,
where θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θz. Based on the original bid space,
the agent runs the order preserving encryption scheme to
generate a set of mapped bids:
Θ̂ =
{
θˆ1, θˆ2, . . . , θˆz
}
,
where θˆi = OPES(θi) and θˆ1 ≥ θˆ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θˆz. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the maximal mapped
bid is upper bounded by 2t for some t, e.g., t = 32 in our
evaluation part.
Each bidder si ∈ S with original bid bi = θi′ contacts
the agent to fetch her/his mapped bid bˆi = θˆi′ from the
mapped bid space Θˆ via oblivious transfer. This guar-
antees that bidder si only knows θˆi′ , and has no idea of
the other z − 1 mapped bids in Θ̂, while the agent does
not know which mapped bid is chosen by the bidder si.
However, the agent may still know the original bid of the
bidder si if she can access the mapped bid bˆi. Therefore,
the ad network aj , who is responsible for the bidder si,
further encrypts the bid bˆi using the Paillier scheme with
the public key n and a random value r1i . We note that
the public key n is provided by the auctioneer, and the
random value r1i is generated by the ad network aj for the
bidder si. The doubly encrypted bid of the bidder si is
denoted by ci = En(bˆi, r
1
i ).
For identity preservation, the ad network aj also needs
to encrypt the identities of her/his subordinate bidders.
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The ad network aj encrypts the identity of bidder si by
adopting the Paillier scheme using the public key nj and
the random value r2i , which are both generated by the ad
network aj . The masked identity of the bidder si ∈ S is
denoted by idi = Enj (si, r
2
i ).
Information Publication: To facilitate the auction
verification, the following information should be posted
on the certificated bulletin board:
• l − 1 test sets {TS1, TS2, · · · , TSl−1}: these test sets
are posted by the auctioneer with her/his signature,
and will be used to verify the comparison relation of
the l bids.
• l commitments {COM1, COM2, · · · , COMl}: the
commitment of the bidder si ∈ S is defined as
COMi = (ci, idi). These commitments are calculated
and posted by all the ad networks, and will be used
to verify the auction outcome.
5.2.2. Auction Execution
The auction execution is divided into two stages: the
internal auction stage and the global auction stage. Each
ad network aj ∈ A conducts an internal auction among
her/his bidder members. The ad network aj selects the
highest and the second highest mapped bids, both of which
are sent to the auctioneer with the signature by aj . In the
global auction stage, the auctioneer chooses the globally
highest and second highest mapped bids, i.e., bˆmax and
bˆsec, from the internal auction outcomes provided by all
the ad networks. Finally, the auctioneer determines the
identity of winner smax and corresponding payment bsec:
the auctioneer first delivers the highest mapped bid bˆmax
to the ad network who has submitted it, and the ad net-
work replies with the identity of the winner smax; the auc-
tioneer then sends the second highest mapped bid bˆsec to
the agent, and the agent feeds back the winner’s payment
bsec, which is the original bid of bˆsec. We note the agent
can obtain this payment bsec by using the inverse function
of OPES(·), i.e., bsec = OPES−1(bˆsec).
5.2.3. Verification Operation
After the auction execution stage, the ad networks in
charge of the bidders with bˆmax and bˆsec are required
to mark their commitments on the certificated bulletin
board for verification. We denote these two marked com-
mitments as COM∗max = (c
∗
max, id
∗
max) and COM
∗
sec =
(c∗sec, id
∗
sec).
According the definition of second-price auction [32],
the auction outcome is correct means that the ad space
is sold to the bidder with the globally highest bid bmax,
and her/his payment equals to the globally second highest
bid bsec. Formally, we claim that the auction outcome is
correct if the following two conditions are satisfied:{
bmax ≥ bsec,
bsec ≥ bi,∀i 6= max.
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Figure 2: The process of ordering verification.
During the verification phase, we assume that the auc-
tioneer serves as the prover P, and any party can decide to
be a verifier V. We now describe the verification process,
which consists of three components: winner and payment
verifications, ordering verification, and patching verifica-
tion.
Step 1: Winner and Payment Verifications
In this step, the verifier V wants to check whether the de-
clared outcome (smax, bsec) is consistent with the marked
outcome (s∗max, b
∗
sec). This verification is based on the
computationally binding property of the Paillier homomor-
phic encryption scheme.
First, for winner verification, the ad network aj , who
is responsible for the winner smax, provides her/his pub-
lic key nj and the random value r
2
max. The verifier
V can verify the correctness of the winner’s identity
by checking whether the re-encrypted identity idmax =
Enj (smax, r
2
max) is the same as the marked identity on the
certificated bulletin board, i.e., idmax = id
∗
max.
Second, regarding payment verification, the auctioneer
sends the public key n and the random value r1sec
3 to
the verifier V. In order to check the consistency of the
declared payment, the verifier V needs to ask the agent
for the mapped payment bˆsec by revealing the the orig-
inal payment bsec. Next, the verifier V re-encrypts bˆsec
as csec = En(bˆsec, r
1
sec). The verifier V then examines
whether csec is equal to the marked doubly encrypted pay-
ment on the certificated bulletin board, i.e., csec = c
∗
sec.
The failure of winner and payment verifications implies
that either the ad exchange misreported the outcome or
the ad networks marked the wrong commitments. Under
such circumstance, the ad exchange needs to work with the
corresponding ad networks until the winner and payment
verifications pass. After that, Step 2 begins.
Step 2: Ordering Verification
As the guarantee of order preserving encryption, we can
examine the order of mapped bids to see whether the order
of original bids is correct. We assume that the mapped
3Using private key φ, the auctioneer can recover the random value
r1sec, which is generated by the ad network
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bids are sorted in a non-increasing order:
Γ : bˆ1 ≥ bˆ2 ≥ · · · ≥ bˆl,
where bˆ1 = bˆmax and bˆ2 = bˆsec. For ordering verification,
the prover P should prove that the mapped payment bˆsec
is equal to or less than the winner’s mapped bid bˆmax, and
bˆsec is equal to or greater than the other l−2 mapped bids.
Since the l mapped bids provided by the agent are all in
the range [1, 2t], 2t ≤ n/2, the correctness of the mapped
bids ordering Γ can be verified by applying the privacy
preserving integer comparison protocol in Section 4 over
the l − 1 pairwise comparisons, i.e.,
〈
bˆsec, bˆi
〉
,∀ i 6= sec.
We depict the verification for the l − 2 comparisons〈
bˆsec, bˆi
〉
,∀ 3 ≤ i ≤ l in Figure 2. The relation between
bˆmax and bˆsec can be verified in a similar way. In order to
verify the relation
〈
bˆsec, bˆi
〉
, the verifier V chooses a cer-
tain test set TSi, and sends it with the index i to the prover
P. The prover P then constructs the ciphertext set Ci =
{Ct1 , Ct2 · · · , Ctk} such that bˆsec− bˆi = 2t1 +2t2 +· · ·+2tk ,
and calculates a new random value r∗i . Both the set Ci
and the random value r∗i are sent back to the verifier V,
who then calculates G−1i × Ct1 × · · · × Ctk and En(0, r∗i )
to determine whether to accept or to reject the ordering
verification.
Step 3: Patching Verification
If the first two verification steps do not pass, the auc-
tioneer is accused of cheating, unless she can provide the
evidence that the fault of the outcome is caused by some
ad networks. The auctioneer uses her/his private key φ
to decrypt the doubly encrypted bids on the certificated
bulletin board to obtain all mapped bids. Then, the auc-
tioneer resorts these mapped bids to check the correctness
of the internal auction outcome submitted by each ad net-
work, and thus seeks out those misbehaved ad networks.
5.3. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of ERA.
Theorem 1. ERA guarantees the property of privacy
preservation in terms of bids and identities.
Proof. We first consider bid protection. We note that
the original bids in ERA are doubly encrypted, first by
order preserving encryption and then by Paillier encryp-
tion, before being posted on the certificated bulletin board.
Moreover, order preserving encryption is secure under
ciphertext-only attack [28], and Paillier encryption is se-
mantically secure [30]. Thus, only the party, who owns
the private keys of these two encryption schemes simulta-
neously, can reveal the original bids. However, these two
private keys are separately kept by two different parties in
ERA, where the agent holds the private key for the order
preserving encryption scheme, while the auctioneer holds
the private key for the Paillier homomorphic encryption
scheme. Since we have assumed that there exists no collu-
sion between the agent and the auctioneer, none but each
bidder can know her/his original bid, and thus the bid pro-
tection is achieved.
We then consider identity preservation. In ERA, each
bidder’s identity is encrypted by her/his ad network using
the Paillier encryption scheme, which provides semantic
security. By definition, except the managing ad network,
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary cannot distin-
guish the original identities of different ad bidders. Thus,
the auctioneer cannot link the bid ranking with a specific
bidder.
In conclusion, ERA achieves the privacy preservation of
advertisers. 
Theorem 2. ERA is a verifiable ad auction mechanism.
Proof. We claim that if both Step 1 and Step 2 in the ver-
ification operation stage pass, the outcome of the auction
is provably correct. If Step 1 passes, due to the uniqueness
of Paillier-type ciphertext, the winner and corresponding
payment published by the ad exchange are exactly consis-
tent with the marked ones on the certificate bulletin board,
i.e., bˆmax = bˆ
∗
max and bˆsec = bˆ
∗
sec. If Step 2 also passes,
on one hand, the bid of the marked winner is greater than
or equal to the marked payment, i.e., bˆ∗max ≥ bˆ∗sec; on the
other hand, the marked payment is equal to or greater than
the other l − 2 mapped bids, i.e., bˆ∗sec ≥ bˆi,∀i 6= sec,max.
Hence, the rules of second-price auction are satisfied, and
ERA is a verifiable ad auction mechanism. 
6. Evaluation Results
ERA integrates several cryptographic tools to guarantee
privacy preservation and verifiability. A practical ad auc-
tion mechanism should incur low cost in terms of compu-
tation, communication, and storage overheads, such that
it can be deployed in today’s ad exchanges. We show the
evaluation results of ERA in this section.
Simulation Setting: We have implemented ERA us-
ing network simulation. The possible original bids range
from $0.01 to $100 with an increment of $0.01, which
is typically the smallest billable unit in today’s ad ex-
changes [33]. The maximal mapped bid is set as 232. In
the oblivious transfer, the group order ρ is 1024-bit long,
and the size of ξi is bounded in 32 bits. The Paillier ho-
momorphic encryption scheme is implemented using an
open-source library [34], in which the public key is set
1024-bit long. The running environment is a standard 64-
bit Ubuntu 14.04 Linux operating system on a desktop
with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 3.10GHz.
6.1. Computation Overhead
We now show the computation overhead of three im-
portant components in ERA, i.e., mapped bid generation,
auction execution, and verification.
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6.1.1. Mapped Bid Generation
By averaging 1000 simulation instances, in Figure 3, we
plot the computation overhead of the agent for generating
mapped bid for each bidder, when the number of possible
bids increases from 5000 to 10000 with a step of 500. We
can see that the computation overhead grows linearly with
the number of possible bids, and reaches around 500ms at
10000 possible bids. This is because the computation over-
head mainly comes from running the oblivious transfer,
in which the agent should calculate z auxiliary messages,
i.e., {ξi|1 ≤ i ≤ z}. This implies that the computation
overhead of mapped bid generation is proportional to the
number of possible bids z.
6.1.2. Auction Execution
We measure the metrics of auction latency and auction
scale to understand the computation overhead of the auc-
tion execution in ERA.
Figure 4 shows the auction latency of ERA when the
number of bidders ranges from 2 × 105 to 10 × 105 with
an increment of 2 × 105, and the number of ad networks
can be chosen as 60, 80, and 100. The first observation
Table 2: Auction Latency (ms).
#bidders (×104) 2 4 6 8 10
ERA with 100 ad networks 0.27 0.57 0.88 1.21 1.53
Benchmark model 39.47 82.73 126.85 171.32 212.56
Table 3: Computation overhead of verification (s).
Preparation Operation
#bidders (×104) Test Set
Generation
Commitment
Generation
Ordering Patching
2 1.00×104 316.85 132.26 117.08
4 2.00×104 631.52 265.69 233.58
6 3.00×104 946.46 393.86 349.78
8 4.00×104 1263.91 527.03 466.04
10 5.00×104 1577.34 656.84 582.61
from Figure 4 is that when the number of ad networks
is fixed, the auction latency of ERA increases with the
number of bidders. The second key observation is that
when the number of bidders is fixed, the auction latency
decreases with the number of ad network.
For more intuitive comparison, we also list the auction
latency of ERA with 100 ad networks and that of the
benchmark model with none ad network (i.e., traditional
second-price auction model) in Table 2. We can see that in
a small-scale auction, e.g., 2×105 bidders, ERA is roughly
50× better than the benchmark model. When the scale of
auction becomes larger, ERA’s advantage over the bench-
mark model is more remarkable. Furthermore, we set the
upper bound of the auction latency to be 10ms, and thus
compare the maximal bidders that ERA and the bench-
mark model can support, respectively. The evaluation re-
sults show that the benchmark model can only handle up
to 57, 200 bidders, while ERA can support 5, 704, 200 bid-
ders.
These evaluation results demonstrate that ERA can in-
deed help to reduce the auction latency by introducing a
proper number of intermediary ad networks, especially in
large-scale ad auctions.
6.1.3. Verification
We now investigate the computation overhead of the ver-
ification, including the preparation and operation phases.
In this set of simulation, we set the maximum number of
bidders and the number of ad networks to be 105 and 100,
respectively. Table 3 lists the evaluation results.
The preparation phase can be further divided into two
parts: the generation of test sets by the auctioneer and
the generation of commitments by ad networks. From Ta-
ble 3, we can find that the auctioneer has higher com-
putation overhead (about 31.70×) than that of each ad
network. This outcome stems from that the auctioneer
should calculate l − 1 test sets, around 0.5s for each test
set generation. In contrast, each ad network just needs to
generate commitments for her/his bidder members.
The computation overhead of the operation phase
mostly comes from the ordering verification and patching
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verification4. From Table 3, we can see that the computa-
tion overheads of these two components increase with the
auction scale. In particular, when the number of bidders
reaches 105, the time overheads of ordering verification
and patching verification are 656.84s and 582.61s, respec-
tively. Combining with Figure 4, we can analyze that the
computation overhead of verification is higher than that
of auction execution. Since the verification can be con-
ducted off-line, the running time constrain on verification
is not so strict. Hence, the time consumption of verifica-
tion is affordable when ERA is integrated into practical ad
exchanges.
6.2. Storage and Communication Overheads
Figure 5 plots the storage overheads of the ad exchange,
the agent, and each ad network, where the number of pos-
sible bids is fixed at 10000, the maximal number of bid-
ders is set to be 105, and the number of ad networks is
100. We can see that the storage overheads of the ad ex-
change and each ad network grow linearly with the num-
ber of bidders, while the storage overhead of the agent
remains unchanged. The reason is that the storage over-
head of the agent mostly comes from storing the original
and mapped bids, which is independent of the number of
bidders. We can also find that the ad exchange spends
much more storage space than each ad network. This is
because the ad exchange needs to maintain the certificated
bulletin board, on which all test sets and commitments are
posted, whereas each ad network only stores the mapped
bids, identities, and ad tags of her/his bidder members.
We also measure ERA’s communication overhead, which
is mainly incurred by the interactions in oblivious transfer
and ordering verification. On one hand, in the oblivious
transfer, each bidder receives 10000 32-bit long messages,
i.e., {ξi|i ∈ [1, 10000]}. On the other hand, the prover and
4The computation overhead of the winner and payment verifica-
tions is omitted here because it is extremely lower than the other
two steps.
the verifier need to transfer {TSi, i, Ci, r∗i |i ∈ [1, l], i 6= 2}
in the ordering verification, which speeds 800MB band-
width when the number of bidder is 105.
7. Related Work
In this section, we briefly review the related work about
the privacy preserving and verifiable auction design.
Inspired by early works [35, 36], various privacy preserv-
ing and verifiable auction mechanisms have been exten-
sively studied. The existing works generally fall into the
following three categories with different auction models.
No Auctioneer: Bidders themselves jointly determine
the auction outcome by adopting the ideas from secure
multiparty computation [31, 37, 38]. These mechanisms
ensure bid protection and auction correctness, but induce
unaffordable computation and communication overheads.
Therefore, these mechanisms are inefficient and impracti-
cal in the scenario of ad exchanges.
One Auctioneer: One auctioneer is responsible for
conducting the full auction. Parkes et al. [16] proposed a
method based on the Paillier cryptosystem to achieve ver-
ifiability. Inspired by secret sharing, Rabin et al. [18, 39]
developed an efficient, novel, and secure solution for val-
idating the correctness of an auction outcome. However,
their method requires the leakage of bidding information
to the auctioneer.
Additional Third Party: A third party is introduced
to cooperate with the auctioneer to run the auctions.
The scheme proposed by Naor et al. in [40] constructed a
boolean circuit, which calculates the auction outcome for
any given set of bids. Based on RSA, Juels and Szydlo pro-
posed a privacy preserving auction mechanism with a rea-
sonable computational complexity [41]. Specific to online
applications, a number of auction mechanisms [20, 21, 25]
get a good tradeoff between performance and security. Un-
fortunately, these works only consider bid protection, but
ignore the problem of verification. ERA belongs to this
category, and moves forwards to guarantee verifiability and
privacy preservation at the same time.
When these existing privacy preserving and/or verifiable
auction mechanisms are directly applied to ad exchanges,
they have high computation and communication complex-
ity. Thus, these works could only support auctions with
small scale [37, 42, 43] or a limited number of possible
bids [44, 45, 46], which may be unacceptable for today’s
ad exchanges.
The most relevant work is paper [19], in which an online
verifiable auction mechanism for ad exchanges was pro-
posed. However, the bid protection was not considered,
and the interactions between the ad exchange and the ad
bidders are too frequent. Therefore, jointly considering
both security and efficiency requirements, ERA is the first
efficient, privacy preserving, and verifiable online auction
mechanism for ad exchanges.
10
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the first secure mecha-
nism ERA for ad exchanges, achieving both privacy preser-
vation and verifiability. In ERA, the outcomes of ad auc-
tions can be calculated and verified to be correct, while
maintaining the private information of advertisers. We
have implemented ERA, and extensively evaluated its
performance. Evaluation results have demonstrated that
ERA satisfies the desirable properties of low-latency and
large-scale for practical ad exchanges.
As for future work, one possible direction is to em-
ploy a stronger but still time-efficient encryption scheme
to achieve privacy preservation during auction calculation
and verification. Another interesting direction is to con-
sider the security issues in the allocation of packaged ad
spaces.
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